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Exploring Taxation as a Substitute for
Overregulation in the Development
Process
Stewart E. Sterk†
INTRODUCTION
The process of land use regulation has endured heavy
criticism in recent years, both nationally and, more particularly,
in New York City. In addition to public outcry over the use of
eminent domain power, influential groups have challenged the
use of one of the newest tools in the land use toolkit: Community
Benefit Agreements (CBAs).1 Some critics have expressed
concerns over inadequate community representation in the CBA
process.2 Others have objected to the use of the land use process
to advance public and private ends unrelated to traditional land
use objectives.3 Both groups regard the advent of CBAs as a sign
of breakdown in the regulatory process.

†
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1
A Community Benefit(s) Agreement (CBA) is a contract negotiated between a
developer and organized community representatives that promises various community
benefits in exchange for the community groups’ endorsement of a development project.
JULIAN GROSS ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 9 (May 2005), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/
pdf/cba2005final.pdf. See Terry Pristin, Community Pacts Questioned in the Zoning
Process, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/28/realestate/commercial/28cba.html (noting opposition to the use of CBAs by both
the Bloomberg administration and the New York City Bar Association).
2
Nathan Markey, Atlantic Yards Community Benefit Agreement: A Case
Study of Organizing Community Support for Development, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 377,
384-88 (2010); Nicholas Confessore, To Build Arena, Developer First Builds Bridges,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/
10/14/nyregion/14yards.html; Matthew Schuerman, Ratner-Style Deal with Columbia
University, N.Y. OBSERVER (Aug. 15, 2005), http://observer.com/2005/08/ratnerstyledeal-with-columbia-university.
3
See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Community Benefits Agreements and
Comprehensive Planning: Balancing Community Empowerment and the Police Power,
18 J.L. & POL’Y 157, 207-09 (2009); David W. Chen, Bloomberg Team Pressed Hard for
Use of Yankee Luxury Suite, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at A41, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/nyregion/30stadium.html; Terry Pristin, In Major
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The criticisms leveled at CBAs, the expansive use of
eminent domain,4 and other pillars of modern land use
regulation5 raise an important question: if the process is
broken, can it be fixed? And if it cannot, should we rely more on
taxation as a method of regulating land use and less on
regulation? In other areas of law—particularly in
environmental law—regulatory strategies have made greater
use of market mechanisms to achieve regulatory goals.6 Might
we better achieve land use goals by exchanging regulation for
taxation, thereby freeing developers from regulatory
constraints while increasing tax revenues that could target the
externalities development might cause?
My tentative answer is yes. We would be better off with
a carefully designed system that taxes development than we
are with the present system. A taxation-based system clearly
represents a second-best solution—one that would leave Henry
George turning over in his grave.7 But a tax on development, if
combined with vast streamlining of the development-approval
process, would ultimately prove less burdensome for developers
and would eliminate several distortions that the current
regulatory scheme generates.

Projects, Agreeing Not to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at C6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/14/realestate/commercial/14agree.html.
4
Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491,
498, 543-51 (2006) (advocating a ban on economic development takings); Ilya Somin,
Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 183, 190-210 (2007) (advocating a ban on economic development takings).
5
See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the
“Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81 (2011) (criticizing the zoning amendment
process); Stewart E. Sterk, Environmental Review in the Land Use Process: New York’s
Experience with SEQRA, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 2041 (1992) (criticizing the
environmental-review process).
6
See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (advocating for market-based
pollution trading initiatives); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008) (advocating a
CO2 cap-and-trade system). An example of a successful cap-and-trade program
implemented in the United States is the Acid Rain Program, which utilizes caps to
limit SO2 emissions and allocates emissions allowances based on performance
standards. See Clean Air Act §§ 401-416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2000); DOUGLAS A.
BURNS ET AL., NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM REPORT TO
CONGRESS 2011: AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT, at ES 2-3 (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2011_napap_508.pdf
(concluding that the Clean Air Act successfully reduced SO2 and NOx emissions).
7
See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 223-27 (Bob Drake ed., 2006)
(1879). Henry George advocated a single tax on vacant land, rather than a tax on
developments.
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MARKETS AND PLANNING: THE EXTERNALITY PROBLEM
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ZONING

One of the extraordinary advantages of a private
property system lies in its concentration of decision-making
responsibility in a single person: the owner.8 Because the owner
will, through market transactions, realize all of the benefits
derived from expenditures on development, the owner has
incentives to acquire the best available information about
potential buyers’ or tenants’ market preferences. At the same
time, the owner of parcel A need not waste time and energy
accumulating information about parcels B through Z; those
parcels’ owners will focus on making their respective parcels as
productive as possible.
The age-old difficulty with leaving all development
decisions to the property owner is that many uses of property
generate externalities. Historically, the common law addressed
externality problems through a combination of nuisance doctrine
and the enforcement of private covenants. Over time, however,
these devices proved inadequate to address externality problems.
First, because nuisance doctrine is primarily retrospective in
operation, it provided only a weak foundation for internalizing
potential externalities. Additionally, because private covenants
may require negotiation among multiple property owners, high
transaction costs made them an inadequate solution to mediumand large-scale externality problems.
Zoning developed as a public-law response to the
externality problem. It was simple in concept and potentially
simple in operation. The local zoning ordinance would divide
the municipality into districts, and each parcel would be
limited to a set of uses that were compatible with other
permitted uses in the district.9 Industrial uses would be
prohibited on all parcels in a residential district, creating an
“average reciprocity of advantage”10 since each owner would be
both benefited and burdened by the prohibition of industrial
8

See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 354-55 (1967); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1719, 1729, 1754-55 (2004).
9
See 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 1.01(c), at 120 (4th ed. rev. 1994). Euclidean zoning refers to the early zoning concept
of separating incompatible land uses through rigid legislative rules. Id.; see also Vill. of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (upholding ordinance dividing
municipality into zoning districts with different limits on use, area, and height).
10
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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uses. Recognizing that foresight would be imperfect, however,
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act11 and most local
ordinances incorporated a “safety valve” permitting a landowner
to apply for a variance when circumstances unique to the parcel
made strict application of the ordinance impracticable.12
II.

INTRODUCING FLEXIBILITY AND ELIMINATING
“AS-OF-RIGHT” DEVELOPMENT

Not surprisingly, zoning proved to be an imperfect
mechanism for eliminating land use externalities. Zoning
eliminated conflicts between broad categories of incompatible
uses, but it did little to control more fine-grained externalities.
Suppose, for instance, a developer were to propose a
residential development in a district zoned for single-family
homes on one-quarter-acre lots. The typical zoning ordinance
would not include a provision that ensures the development’s
internal roads connect to the municipality’s road network in a
way that minimizes congestion and provides optimal access for
police, fire, and other emergency services. The ordinance also
would not address water or sewer connections, nor would it
address drainage problems. Additionally, the ordinance would
not promote traffic safety by eliminating unbroken streets that
encourage speeding or by minimizing curb cuts onto main
roads. To address these issues, many jurisdictions now impose
a subdivision-review process that often requires discretionary
review by a body separate from the zoning board of appeals.13
11

STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (Dep’t of Commerce 1926).
See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(1)(b) (McKinney 2011). See Bazinsky v.
Kesbec, Inc., 19 N.Y.S.2d 716, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940) (“The purpose of a variance
[from a zoning ordinance] is to afford a safety valve, so that the carrying out of the
strict letter of the Zoning Ordinance may not occasion unnecessary hardship to
particular property owners.”).
13
See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276 (McKinney 2011); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-728
(McKinney 2011) (conferring subdivision review authority on planning board). Local
subdivision regulations are enacted to achieve various public goals, including protecting future
land purchasers’ interests and assuring adequate public facilities related to the proposed
development. 5 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, supra
note 9, § 89:3. For example, the stated purpose of the New York enabling acts is to:
12

[P]rovid[e] for the future growth and development of the town and affording
adequate facilities for the housing, transportation, distribution, comfort,
convenience, safety, health and welfare of its population, the town board
may, by resolution, authorize and empower the planning board to approve
preliminary and final plats of subdivisions showing lots, blocks or sites, with
or without streets or highways, within that part of the town outside the
limits of any incorporated village.
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276.
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But these traffic, drainage, and connection issues are not
confined to the subdivision context. In fact, they can also arise
when a developer erects a single project that requires no
subdivision. For these projects, many municipalities—pursuant
to their authority under state law—require discretionary review
of “site plans” for projects that meet certain size thresholds.14
Subdivision and site-plan review emerged from the
notion that zoning was not restrictive enough. At the same time,
municipalities began to recognize that zoning was sometimes too
restrictive, leading to cookie-cutter developments even where
less restrictive alternatives might have been equally effective at
eliminating externalities.15 As a result, municipalities
established planned unit developments and floating zones in
order to provide additional flexibility, controlling density
without mandating rigid lot configurations.16 Again, these tools
required discretionary determinations by municipal officials.
Concerns about the adverse effects that some
development might have on neighborhood character—
constructing an ugly building, erecting a garish sign, or tearing
down a historic landmark—generated new forms of
discretionary review. Often, municipalities established distinct
bodies to consider these issues—architectural-review boards17

14

See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a (McKinney 2011); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7725-a (McKinney 2011).
15
See Cheney v. Vill. 2 at New Hope, Inc., 241 A.2d 81, 83 (Pa. 1968) (“This
general approach to zoning fares reasonably well so long as . . . no one cares that the
overall appearance of the municipality resembles the design achieved by using a cookie
cutter on a sheet of dough.”); Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A
Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
47, 47 (1965).
16
Planned unit developments are created when a local legislature zones land
as a planned unit development district, inviting a developer to propose a project that
the municipality will consider as a whole, rather than requiring the developer to abide
by pre-determined standards. Daniel R. Mandelker, Legislation for Planned Unit
Developments and Master-Planned Communities, 40 URB. LAW. 419, 420-21 (2008). See,
e.g., Cheney, 241 A.2d at 84-85. A floating zone is a zoning district created by a
municipal ordinance that specifies the uses within the zone, but is not placed on a
zoning map. A developer who wishes to build in accordance with the enumerated
standards may submit a development application to have the zoning district apply to
an existing parcel of land. The zoning district is added to the zoning map once the
development application has been approved. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER &
THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW § 4.16 (1998). See also,
e.g., Rodgers v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 735-36 (N.Y. 1951).
17
See, e.g., Torsoe Bros. Constr. Corp. v. Architecture & Cmty. Appearance
Bd. of Review, 502 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (upholding local law
delegating authority to architecture and community appearance board of review).
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and landmark preservation commissions18—rather than
entrusting review to zoning or planning boards already charged
with reviewing other aspects of the development.
Architectural-review boards often respond to concerns
about extremely localized externalities. At the other end of the
spectrum, a number of states have taken steps to account for
externalities that might extend beyond the municipality itself.
New York and California have taken the lead in instituting
environmental-review processes that require developers to
show that their projects minimize potential adverse
environmental impacts.19 And a number of states have required
approvals by state or regional agencies before certain
development projects may begin.20
All of these review processes root out externalities that
development projects generate. But they do so at significant
cost. First, review by multiple boards—sometimes with
inconsistent agendas—constrains development and makes it
more expensive. Indeed, environmental review alone often
requires production of multivolume tomes that cost a fortune to
produce.21 Second, boards often condition approval on changes
unrelated to remedying externalities. When members of a
citizen board are charged with reviewing an application, their
natural tendency is to be proactive. Why waste time reviewing
an application if they do not seize the opportunity to improve
the developer’s plan? As a result, even if the developer’s plan
generates no significant externalities, each member of the
board may tinker with it in a good-faith effort to make it
“better.” Third, citizen boards often believe that they lack the
expertise to review applications. Large municipalities may hire
a staff of planners and lawyers to assist in reviewing those
applications.22 In smaller municipalities, paid planning
consultants and lawyers might fill that role.23 Either way, the
18

For example, the New York City Landmark Preservation Commission is
vested with the power to designate historical landmarks and regulate changes to the
designated buildings. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 25-301 to -321 (1992).
19
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21,000-21,177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991).
20
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6007 (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 205-1 to -18 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 197.005 to .285 (West 2012).
21
See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney 2012) (detailing
the environmental impact statement preparation procedure); see also Sterk, supra note
5, at 2076-84 (1992) (discussing cost and bulk of environmental impact statements).
22
See Sterk, supra note 5, at 2044.
23
See, e.g., TOWN OF KENT, N.Y., CODE § 66A-13 (adopted Jan. 24, 2012),
available at http://www.ecode360.com/15739813 (requiring final approval by Planning
Board Engineer and Planning Board Environmental Consultant for all major
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cost of those consultants is often passed on to developers in the
form of application fees.24
Moreover, many of these externalities could or would be
rooted out even in the absence of extensive discretionary
review. First, market forces constrain the developer. Any harm
neighbors might suffer as a result of ugly houses, cumbersome
road connections, or excessively long blocks will be dwarfed by
the harm those features would generate for the development’s
home purchasers. Of course, market constraints will be
imperfect, both because purchasers may not immediately
recognize problematic road connections or excessively long
blocks, and because developers may decide that the additional
benefits of squeezing more homes into the same space outweigh
the purchase-price reductions that may result when access and
safety are compromised. But this leads to a second mechanism
for controlling externalities generated by the development:
mechanical rules. A municipality could (and many do) impose
requirements or standards for road construction, emergency
vehicle access, block length, or the size and material of
commercial signs.25 As in other areas of law, these mechanical
rules will be both underinclusive and overinclusive,26 but they
will also ease the developer’s design burden and reduce the
time and expense associated with compliance.

subdivision plats); id. § 77-60(T), available at http://www.ecode360.com/12348201
(permitting Planning Board to consult persons with building architecture and design
expertise or landscape architecture expertise when reviewing site plans).
24
See, e.g., id. §§ 55-1 to -2, available at http://www.ecode360.com/8322390
and http://www.ecode360.com/8322391 (requiring applicant and landowner to pay all
engineering, legal, and consulting fees associated with the application review process).
25
See, e.g., Bevan v. Brandon Twp., 475 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Mich. 1991)
(upholding an ordinance prohibiting landowners from building more than one home on
property unless access to the property was provided by a road wide enough to allow
access for emergency vehicles); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 324
A.2d 113, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (sustaining an ordinance limiting the
size of commercial signs); Party City of Nanuet, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 622 N.Y.S.2d
331, 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (upholding Board of Appeals determination denying a
sign permit for sign that was dissimilar in color and design to other signs in the area).
26
See Jules L. Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
703, 710 (1991) (“[R]ules are necessarily under- and over-inclusive with respect to the sets
of reasons that support or ground them.”); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law,
14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645, 646 (1991) (describing rules as “entrenched
generalizations likely to be under- and over-inclusive in particular cases . . . .”); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992)
(comparing rules and standards); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 953, 976 (1995) (discussing planning advantages of rules over standards).
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EXACTIONS AND IMPACT FEES

The discretionary review processes discussed above
were developed to mitigate or eliminate the negative
externalities associated with development. Suppose, however,
that mitigation is impossible or inefficient. For example,
imagine that a proposed development would increase
congestion in existing parks or on existing roads, but the
developer cannot alter the development to reduce congestion.
Why not require the developer to compensate for those
externalities rather than mitigate them? The developer could
make monetary contributions that the municipality could use
to build new roads or parks.27 Alternatively, if the municipality
concluded that other, unrelated projects were more important
than improving roads or parks, the municipality might devote
the money to those improvements. This compensation scheme
has potential to create a win-win situation: the developer would
obtain approval even though the development generates
negative externalities that would otherwise justify its rejection,
and the developer’s contribution might more than offset the
harm generated by the development.
The problem—as emphasized by Justice Scalia in his
opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission28—is that
exactions and impact fees open up the development process to
people who would not be adversely affected by the proposed
development, but who stand to gain if the developer is required
to make payments to the municipality. As a result,
municipalities might be tempted to impose restrictions on
development unrelated to the externalities the development
creates, only to trade development approval for cash or other
concessions. Any constituency looking to reduce municipal
taxes or increase particular municipal services becomes a
potential opponent to development, further increasing its costs.
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Nollan and Dolan v. City of
Tigard29 constrained a municipality’s use of exactions by
27

At least twenty-seven states have statutory provisions authorizing impact
fees. ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., IMPACT FEES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
PROPORTIONATE SHARE DEVELOPMENT FEES 103 (AM. PLANNERS ASS’N PRESS, 2009). See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.31801 (2012); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 10503-A to 10508-A (West 2012);
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2319 (West 2012); see also Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle,
A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling Legislation, 25 URB. LAW. 491, 491-92 (1993);
Steven B. Schwanke, Local Governments and Impact Fees: Public Need, Property Rights,
and Judicial Standards, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 215, 220-23, 245-47 (1989).
28
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837, 841 (1987).
29
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
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requiring that the exaction have a “nexus” with the reason for
requiring development approval in the first place, and that the
exaction be roughly proportional to the external costs
generated by the development.30
In recent years, CBAs have emerged as a strategy for
evading Nollan and Dolan. Municipalities cannot directly
extract concessions unrelated to the reasons for requiring
development approval, so they instead withhold development
approval until the developer has secured the support of a
variety of neighborhood groups.31 Those groups, in turn, bargain
with the developer to secure benefits—including jobs and wage
rates—that have little or nothing to do with land use
externalities.32 Developers willingly participate in the process,
however, because obtaining the support of neighborhood groups
increases both the likelihood and speed of approval.33
IV.

BYPASSING THE PROCESS

Small-sized to medium-sized developers are, for the
most part, stuck with the process described above. They must
contend with a heavy dose of discretionary review, augmented
by the potential need to satisfy rent-seeking community
groups. Larger developers, however, may seek out alternatives
to this process. The Atlantic Yards project provides an apt
example. Forrest City Ratner, the developer, took advantage of
a New York statute that excuses a qualifying urban
30

Id.; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. See Note, Municipal Development Exactions,
the Rational Nexus Test, and the Federal Constitution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 992 (1989)
(explaining the rational nexus test); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and
Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (criticizing
limitations on exactions as inefficient and failing to protect landowners from the threat
of overregulation); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas:
Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 654-67 (2004)
(criticizing the exactions rules as overly rigid).
31
Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government
Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 7 (2010).
32
Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits
Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations for
Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 291, 300-17 (2008) (detailing various CBAs, including the Hollywood and
Highland Center, the Staples Center, and the San Diego Ballpark Village).
33
Id. at 296; see also Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: BargainedFor Zoning That Is Neither Illegal Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV.
383, 394 (2004) (Among other benefits, “[u]nder the development agreement model of
land use controls, the developer gains the following: (1) certainty as to the governing
regulations for the development project; (2) the ability to bargain for support and the
coordination of approvals; (3) easier and less-costly financing because of the reduction
of the risk of non-approval.”).
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development corporation project from compliance with local
zoning codes where the corporation decides that compliance is
not feasible.34 As a result, the entire development managed to
bypass New York City’s cumbersome review process.35
Atlantic Yards provides another blueprint for a
developer looking to avoid local review: persuade a government
entity to exercise its eminent domain power.36 Increased use of
eminent domain to implement a major project in part reflects
the need to overcome holdout problems,37 but converting a
private project into a quasi-public project often has the added
advantage of bypassing ordinary zoning processes.
V.

STREAMLINING THE PROCESS: IS TAXATION AN
ALTERNATIVE?

A.

The Problem

Our current system of land use regulation suffers from
at least three significant problems: too many regulatory bodies,
too much discretion, and too much participation.
Consider first the abundance of regulatory bodies.
Imagine a landowner who wants to renovate several retail
stores on the main street of a suburban municipality. The land
is zoned for the retail uses the landowner proposes, and the
landowner’s proposal does not exceed the ordinance’s floor area
ratio. But the landowner may still need to apply to the zoning
34

N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6266(3) (McKinney 2011) (giving the State’s Urban
Development Corporation the power to override local law when it determines that
compliance “is not feasible or practicable”). See Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban
Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference to Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in
Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards Project, 42/43 URB. LAW. 287, 307-10 (2010) (discussing the
Empire State Development Corporation’s removal of Atlantic Yards from the Uniform
Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP)).
35
NEW YORK, N.Y., R.C.N.Y. tit. 62, ch. 2 §§ 2-01 to -10 (effective Oct. 1, 1991),
available beginning at http://72.0.151.116/nyc/rcny/Title62_2-01.asp. See generally N.Y.C.
DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, UNIFORM LAND USE REVIEW PROCEDURE (ULURP), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml.
36
Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 165-66 (N.Y.
2009) (upholding the use of eminent domain in the development of the Atlantic Yards
Project). See AKRF, INC., ATLANTIC YARDS ARENA AND REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT: BLIGHT
STUDY (2006), available at http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2012/06/atlantic-yardssite-now-cleared-but.html (declaring the Atlantic Yards project site blighted).
37
See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain
Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 20-21 (2006) (“[P]rivate parties can circumvent the holdout problem and
assemble land using secret buying agents. These buying agents are able to avoid the
holdout problem using a double-blind acquisition system.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75-78 (1986) (describing the holdout
problem and the use of eminent domain as a solution to this problem).
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board of appeals for a parking variance, and the landowner
may also need a special permit from the zoning board of
appeals if any of the proposed retail stores is a restaurant.38
The landowner would need to obtain site-plan approval and
environmental review from the planning board, in addition to
approval of any commercial signs from an architectural-review
board.39 Each board will want to know how the others are
dealing with the project, and no board will act on the
application in a single meeting.40 The zoning board of appeals
and the planning board will each have separate lawyers, and
the planning board may have a variety of consultants.41
Although the lawyers and consultants will bill the municipality
for their services, the municipality will pass the costs directly
to the applicant through application fees—leaving the
municipality largely indifferent to the cost of reviewing the
application.42 Moreover, this already-complex process reveals
only a fraction of the obstacles that would face the developer of
a comparable project in New York City. These projects often
involve the participation of the city planning commission, local
community boards, the respective borough president, and the
city council.43
The discretion conferred on each of these regulatory
bodies exacerbates the problem of multiple decision makers. Of
course, there would be no reason to have multiple bodies unless
each one could exercise some discretion. Indeed, few
community volunteers want to be a rubber stamp; instead, they
want to exercise their discretion to improve the developer’s
proposed project. But discretion without guidelines presents a
38

See, e.g., TOWN OF RAMAPO, N.Y., CODE § 376-151 (adopted Nov. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.ecode360.com/11859693 (authorizing zoning Board of Appeals
to grant variances).
39
See, e.g., id. § 42-2, available at http://www.ecode360.com/11856228 (authorizing
planning board to review and approve all site plans). If a sign is not submitted as part of
the site plan, a sign plan must be submitted and subject to review by the Community
Design Review Committee. Id. § 376-83(C), available at http://www.ecode360.com/11859280.
40
See, e.g., id. § 376-112, available at http://www.ecode360.com/11859376
(requiring the planning board to provide public hearings for all special permit applications).
41
See, e.g., CITY OF RYE, N.Y., CODE § 87-1(B) (adopted Sept. 15, 2010)
available at http://www.ecode360.com/6972071 (authorizing city boards to refer
applications to “such engineering, planning, legal, technical or environmental
consultant[s] . . . as they deem reasonably necessary”).
42
See, e.g., TOWN OF RAMAPO, N.Y., CODE § 122-2 (adopted Feb. 24, 1999),
available at http://www.ecode360.com/11856611 (requiring applicants to place funds in
escrow to reimburse the town for any fees paid in relation to application review
conducted by a planning consultant).
43
See NEW YORK, N.Y., R.C.N.Y. tit. 62, ch. 2 §§ 2-03 to -07 (effective Oct. 1,
1991), available at http://72.0.151.116/nyc/rcny/Title62_2-03.asp.
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serious problem for developers. It is one thing for a developer to
explain why its project deviates from an established rule or
standard, which is the typical issue on a variance application.44
It is quite another to seek approval before a board whose
members can insist on changes to any aspect of the project
simply as the price of approval. To begin with, the developer
may have little guidance regarding which aspects of the project
will provoke concerns by members of the board, which
frustrates the developer’s ability to craft plans that will elicit
quick approval. Moreover, even when the actions of a planning
board or zoning board of appeals are formally subject to
judicially enforced standards, no sensible developer would want
to endure the cost—both in money and delay—of challenging a

44

N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b (McKinney 2011) sets forth the framework the
Board of Appeals must use in evaluating applications for use variances and area
variances. In evaluating use variance applications:
(b) No such use variance shall be granted by a board of appeals without a
showing by the applicant that applicable zoning regulations and restrictions
have caused unnecessary hardship. In order to prove such unnecessary
hardship the applicant shall demonstrate to the board of appeals that for
each and every permitted use under the zoning regulations for the particular
district where the property is located, (1) the applicant cannot realize a
reasonable return, provided that lack of return is substantial as
demonstrated by competent financial evidence; (2) that the alleged hardship
relating to the property in question is unique, and does not apply to a
substantial portion of the district or neighborhood; (3) that the requested use
variance, if granted, will not alter the essential character of the
neighborhood; and (4) that the alleged hardship has not been self-created.
Id. § 267-b(2)(b). The standard proscribed for evaluating area variance applications
requires that:
(b) In making its determination, the zoning board of appeals shall take into
consideration the benefit to the applicant if the variance is granted, as
weighed against the detriment to the health, safety and welfare of the
neighborhood or community by such grant. In making such determination the
board shall also consider: (1) whether an undesirable change will be produced
in the character of the neighborhood or a detriment to nearby properties will
be created by the granting of the area variance; (2) whether the benefit
sought by the applicant can be achieved by some method, feasible for the
applicant to pursue, other than an area variance; (3) whether the requested
area variance is substantial; (4) whether the proposed variance will have an
adverse effect or impact on the physical or environmental conditions in the
neighborhood or district; and (5) whether the alleged difficulty was selfcreated, which consideration shall be relevant to the decision of the board of
appeals, but shall not necessarily preclude the granting of the area variance.
Id. § 267-b(3)(b). In evaluating area variances, the board of appeals must “grant the
minimum variance that it shall deem necessary and adequate and at the same time
preserve and protect the character of the neighborhood and the health, safety and
welfare of the community.” Id. § 267-b(3)(c).
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land use board’s action.45 As a practical matter, then, the
boards may exercise far more discretion than the law permits.
Public participation generates an additional set of
problems. There are, of course, advantages to public
participation. Indeed, neighbors are often in the best position
to educate local decision makers about the potential harm
associated with development projects.46 Nevertheless, because
each individual neighbor has a small stake in the development
project compared to the developer’s interest, public choice theory
predicts that neighbors will too often forego participation and
that their perspectives will be underrepresented in the process.47
On the other hand, with the expansion of impact fees, exactions,
and more recently CBAs, the incentive for organized groups to
participate has increased—even where the project itself will
generate few externalities. Accordingly, in light of the limited
incentives for participation among affected groups and the
expanded incentives for participation among unaffected groups
engaged in rent seeking, participation will often generate more
heat than light for decision makers.
B.

Objections to Streamlining the Process

One approach to addressing these difficulties is to
streamline the land use regulation process by returning to
zoning basics: a rule-oriented system, but one with more rules
to deal with externalities that early zoning codes failed to
anticipate. Codes would be longer and would incorporate
features that are currently found in subdivision regulations,
such as standards for road construction, drainage, and water
connections.48 Planning boards, architectural-review boards,

45

Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1731, 1750 (1988); Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings:
The Developer’s Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 518 (1988).
46
See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 74-75 (2001)
(noting that because homeowners are aware that local government policies will affect
the value of their largest single asset, they pay close attention to policies that affect
those values); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 870 (1983) (noting that local
officials obtain expertise by “talking to constituents and interested parties about local
conditions”); see also Sterk, supra note 45, at 1738-39 (discussing difficulties in
assessing the harms a development project may cause).
47
David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75
N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1272-74 (1997); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just
Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT 279, 289-90 (1992).
48
Performance zoning is an alternative to traditional zoning that sets
performance standards regulating the result of an activity, rather than the activity
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and the environmental-review process would be eliminated. A
zoning board of appeals would remain, both to review
interpretations by the local building department and to
consider variance applications, and it would be constrained by
statutory standards.49
The standard objection to a rule-based approach is that
rules are almost always both overinclusive and underinclusive.50
Especially when facts about particular parcels of land are so
individualized—for
example,
topography,
proximity
to
neighboring uses, access to existing road networks—discretionary
determinations are better suited to account for externalities.
Many externalities are easier to identify and control in the
context of a concrete project than they are in the abstract.
In land use cases, however, a countervailing
consideration moves in the other direction: as the
determination becomes more content-specific, rent-seeking
behavior becomes more likely to distort the decision-making
process. If land use regulations were promulgated in advance,
designed to apply globally, and devised behind a (somewhat
porous) “veil of ignorance,”51 rent seeking might be more easily
cabined than when the immediate winners and losers are
readily apparent. Permitting cluster development with
extensive open space in residential districts may appear to be
sensible policy, so long as the development meets specified
design standards, but when a developer proposes a cluster
development next to existing single-family homes, those
neighbors may not agree that the policy is so sensible.
Another objection to a rule-based approach might relate
to the imperfect foresight of the body charged with developing
the rules. Neighborhood circumstances change, and so do
consumer preferences. But, of course, there is nothing (other
than inertia) to prevent municipalities from revisiting the rules
on a periodic basis. Indeed, many communities—often prodded
by their paid planning consultants—attempt to revise their
comprehensive plans on a relatively fixed schedule to account
for changed circumstances.52
itself. Performance standards may be drafted to deal with specific issues. Frederick W.
Acker, Performance Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363, 372-73 (1991).
49
See NEW YORK, N.Y., R.C.N.Y. tit. 62, ch. 2 §§ 2-03 to -07 (effective Oct. 1, 1991).
50
See supra note 26.
51
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (discussing his
“original position” concept and principles of justice).
52
1 E.C. YOKLEY & DOUGLAS SCOTT MACGREGOR, ZONING & PRACTICE LAW
§ 5-4 (4th ed. 2008) (“If any plan is to be truly comprehensive, it must be kept up to
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Perhaps the biggest obstacle to streamlining the
regulatory process is a political one: local governments may be
unwilling to relinquish control over development within their
borders, especially if they will receive nothing in return. The
costs of the current bureaucratic system are not always
apparent to municipal officials. First, the municipality incurs
few direct expenditures; most of the expenses are imposed on
developers. Second, the harm in the form of higher home and
office prices is hidden, so long as all other municipalities
engage in the same process. If one municipality were to
eliminate red tape, development might flock to it. But if
purchasers view municipalities as close substitutes for one
another, and other municipalities continued to make
development expensive, local prices would not decline much as
a result of a single municipality’s red-tape reduction.53
C.

Adding Taxation to the Mix

Would it be possible to overcome political obstacles with
a development tax that augmented municipal coffers? Suppose
that a state were to reconfigure the land use process to
eliminate discretionary review. Moreover, suppose that,
instead of that review, the state authorized municipalities to
impose taxes that they could use to address whatever external
costs a rule-based regime failed address.
The idea of taxing development would have Henry
George rolling over in his grave. While a tax on land does not
distort economic activity because the owner of the land cannot
avoid the tax, a tax on development does create avoidance
opportunities: it encourages landowners to engage in activities
exempt from the tax.54 Taken in the abstract, a development tax
is a controversial idea because of its potential to distort land
use decisions.55 But the idea should not be evaluated in the
date. This requires periodic examination and reexamination of the plan by the
planning authorities of the enacting political subdivision. In some instances, state
statutes require formal periodic evaluation of comprehensive plans.”).
53
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 238-43 (1985) (discussing the
impact of regulation on housing prices).
54
Id. at 9-10 (“Many taxes on land are assessed at different rates according
to use. An example is the widespread practice of assessing . . . open space at a smaller
fraction of value than that of developed land (sections 13.1 and 13.8). The supply of
land for these purposes is at least somewhat elastic, so the owner can avoid some land
taxes by his choice of which use to put his land to.”).
55
GEORGE, supra note 7, at 242-45.
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abstract. We already impose a significant tax on development
in the form of time, cost, and concessions made by developers
during a discretionary approval process. The question to
confront, then, is whether a tax on development causes more or
less distortion than the current regime, not whether the tax
causes more distortion than a regime with no tax at all.
Consider how a system that combines rules with taxes
might work. In some ways, the system would operate like
traditional zoning. The local legislative body would enact a
zoning code, albeit a more detailed code than under most
current regimes, incorporating into its rules many of the
features currently found in subdivision regulations. A
developer who complies with the code would truly be entitled to
build “as of right,” subject only to review by a building
inspector to ensure that the project actually complies with the
code. A zoning board of appeals or a similar body would still
need to review the inspector’s conclusions, issue first-order
interpretations, and grant the equivalent of variances, still
constrained by standards articulated in the ordinance.
At the same time, the municipality’s local legislative
body would impose a general tax on development within the
municipality. The tax might be based on square footage or
some other easily measurable feature. Local officials might
even channel development by imposing different taxes on
different kinds of space. For instance, square footage devoted to
affordable housing might be taxed at a rate of zero, while green
buildings might be entitled to a partial exemption—all
determined by preset standards that enable developers to
factor the tax into their development planning.56
The municipality could then use the tax funds it raises
to control externalities generated by development. If the code
failed to adequately address road, water, or sewage needs, the
municipality could use funds to augment inadequate systems.
If open space proved inadequate, the municipality could use the
funds to condemn land for parks. Municipalities might even
allocate the tax revenues to any municipal purpose whatsoever,

56

Development incentives provided by a comprehensive tax scheme are no
more objectionable than the current incentives offered by many municipalities. See,
e.g., TOWN OF BABYLON, N.Y., CODE § 89-86 (2006), available at
http://www.ecode360.com/6806042 (offering a building fee refund for projects that
achieve LEED certified status); CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 13-32-301(c) (2010)
(waiving permit fees for projects that qualify for the Chicago Green Permit Program).
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leaving elected officials free to decide where addressing land
use externalities lies on the list of municipal priorities.57
This combination of rules and taxes would preserve
municipal autonomy. A municipality seeking to encourage
development could keep development taxes low and impose less
stringent standards on developers.58 Conversely, an
antidevelopment municipality could keep taxes high and
impose more stringent standards.
The biggest challenge for a tax-based scheme involves
the practice—which is prevalent in many municipalities—of
imposing excessively restrictive zoning ordinances with the
expectation that the ordinance will be amended when a
developer proposes a sufficiently attractive project.59 If
municipalities were to continue that practice, a tax-based
scheme would accomplish little. All of the review would be
centralized in the local legislative body, which might eliminate
inconsistent review by multiple boards, but the scheme would
do little to reduce rent seeking. A local legislative body—unlike
a zoning board of appeals or a planning board—is not typically
subject to time constraints.60 As a result, when a developer
seeks an amendment, the local legislature is generally free to
take as much time as it wants to review the proposal, taking
input from every potential interest group, and ultimately redrafting the ordinance to impose requirements a developer
could not anticipate.
Limiting municipal power to amend the ordinance could
solve this problem. Of course, evolving circumstances make it
important for municipalities to retain some power to amend
their ordinances, but state legislation could limit municipal
power to enact amendments more often than once every three
57

Opening up the process would increase the opportunity for rent-seeking.
See generally Sterk, supra note 45, at 1745-46 (noting that in a regime without
constraints on who might seek to benefit from exactions, the potential for rent-seeking
increases). The increased opportunity for rent-seeking would not directly affect the
development process so long as rent-seekers are unable to increase the size of the pie
by opposing (or threatening to oppose) a particular development project. Of course,
rent-seekers might seek to impose a higher development tax, but that risks
discouraging marginal development (and threatening the total revenue collected). See
Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478, 509-45 (1991).
58
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 418 (1956) (noting that consumer-voters can choose to move to local community
that best serves their preferences).
59
Fenster, supra note 30, at 622-24.
60
See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(8) (McKinney 2011) (requiring the board
of appeals to render a decision within sixty-two days of the hearing); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55D-73 (West 2011) (requiring the board to render decisions within 120 days).
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years. More frequent amendments would engender a
presumption of invalidity, a presumption that could be overcome
only by proof that the existing ordinance reflects a zoning
“mistake”—a variation on the change or mistake rule currently
in force in a number of states.61 If it were apparent to the local
legislative body that it could not amend its ordinance at will, the
body would have an incentive to avoid excessive restrictions,
since those restrictions would prevent development and
therefore eliminate tax collections.
CONCLUSION
The broad discretion that characterizes our current
process for regulating land use imposes costs disproportionate to
the benefits generated by that discretion. Developers, however,
are the principal organized interest group with an incentive to
reform the process, and even they can pass some of the costs
associated with discretion on to their customers—unorganized
consumers. Reform, then, is likely only if other groups see
benefits in cabining discretionary review. Increased revenue from
a tax on development has the potential to generate those benefits.

61

See, e.g., Clayman v. Prince George’s Cnty., 292 A.2d 689, 693-95 (Md.
1972); Town of Florence v. Sea Lands, Ltd., 759 So. 2d 1221 (Miss. 2000); Albuquerque
Commons P’ship v. City Council, 184 P.3d 411 (N.M. 2008).

